Summary In November 1895, when Conrad Rontgen serendipitously discovered X-rays, epidemiology was effectively limited to the study of infectious disease. What little epidemiological work was done in other fields was done as part of clinical medicine or under the heading of geographical pathology. The risks from exposure to X-rays and subsequently from other types of ionising radiation were consequently discovered by qualitative association or animal experiment. They did not begin to be quantified in humans until half a century later, when epidemiology emerged as a scientific discipline capable of quantifying risks of non-infectious disease and the scientific world was alerted to the need for assessing the effects of the radiation to which large populations might be exposed by the use of nuclear energy in peace and war.
Early observations
Acute tissue damage R6ntgen's (1895) discovery was published in what would now be regarded as the miraculously short time of 1 week. Many people began to experiment with the new tool and it was quickly found that the rays could damage biological tissue. Within 3 months, one experimenter produced a bald patch by trying to detect a coin through his head (Daniel, 1896); a month later Thomas Edison, the inventor of the incandescent electric lamp and so much else, complained that his eyes were sore and red after prolonged experiments (Burrows, 1986) ; and after another 2 months Stevens (1896) reported the production of a painful erythema of the skin. Before a year had passed, many workers had experienced burns of the hands and systemic effects had begun to be recognised. One man, who had experienced several attacks of dermatitis, developed a high fever, languor, diarrhoea and vomiting, and another, whose experiments involved exposing his abdomen for 2 hours a day, complained of abdominal pain and tenderness and diarrhoea, which cleared after a fortnight in the country, recurred when he resumed his experiments, and disappeared after he shielded his body with lead (Walsh 1897) .
The cause of the damage was debated for several years. Bowles was the first to suggest in print, in 1896, that the rays themselves were responsible; but many, including Sylvanus Thompson, first president of the Rontgen Society in Britain, thought that it might be electric charges (Thompson, 1897) . Others thought that platinocyanides used in the fluorescent screens, platinum particles from the tube, ultra-violet rays or the formation of ozone in the tissues might be responsible (Colwell and Russ, 1934) . Conviction that the Rontgen rays were the cause came only in 1900 with the results of Kienbock's experiments on rats and their confirmation by Rollins (1901) in Boston.
Production of cancer
Skin cancer Soon, more serious effects appeared. Four years after Rontgen's discovery, squamous carcinomas began to occur on the hands of workers that were already the site of chronic dermatitis (Frieben, 1902) . The tumours tended to be highly malignant, presumably because continued exposure after the initiation of a malignant clone led to its rapid progression, and many of those affected died from the disease. When, in 1936, the German Rontgen Society erected a monument to the memory of those who had died as a result of their work, 169 names were recorded on it (Meyer, 1937) (1931) reported seeing five radiologists with myeloid leukaemia in a period when he had seen the disease in only one non-radiological physician, which led him to conclude that myeloid leukaemia was particularly common in radiologists. A year later, however, Nielsen (1932) could still find records of only 14 acceptable cases in radiation workers in the literature and when, in 1934, Colwell and Russ reviewed the injuries attributable to X-rays and radium they could not decide whether leukaemia should be included. In the same year Marie Curie died of chronic myeloid leukaemia; but it was another 10 years before any epidemiological evidence stronger than Aubertin's (1931) was obtained. Then March (1944) matched the list of members of the American Roentgen Ray Society with the death notices in the Journal of the American Medical Association and two radiological journals and found that 4.57% of 173 with known causes were attributed to leukaemia against 0.44% of over 50 000 deaths from known cause among non-radiological physicians recorded in the Medical Association Journal. The 10-fold difference was statistically highly significant; but, despite the fact that Furth (1934) had already demon- later, Muller (1927) , a zoologist at the University of Texas, showed that X-rays could produce mutations in fruit flies and that the prevalence of the effect was approximately linearly proportional to the dose. No observation had been made on humans; but the evidence for the production of hereditary mutations was held to be of universal application and its applicability to humans was not questioned.
Criteria for protection
The recognition of the acute effects had led rapidly to the introduction of techniques to reduce the direct exposure of the operator and to limit the dispersal of the rays, once it was recognised that the rays themselves were responsible. The discovery of the possibility of damage to the testes heightened concern and by 1905 the German Rontgen ray expert who discovered the damage was 'encased from Schnurrbart to foot in a veritable suit of armour' (Butcher, 1905 (Gliicksmann, 1952) ; and the genetic effect, which was accepted as due to mutations and capable of being caused by any dose of ionising radiations however small, could be kept to negligible levels by protecting the gonads. Only March's (1944) epidemiological observation, made a year before the explosions, gave cause to think that any long-term effects might still be being produced.
The impact of nuclear power Establishment of the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission Following the atomic explosions, there was great public concern about the possible effects that the radiation might have had. By far the greatest proportion of the approximately 180 000 deaths was the direct result of blast and heat. Several thousand of the immediate survivors, however, died shortly afterwards as a result of acute radiation sickness and thousands more experienced acute symptoms and recovered. What might happen later to those who recovered was unclear. It was recognised that knowledge of the long-term effects of substantial amounts of whole-body irradiation was incomplete and the joint commission of the US Army and Navy, which visited Japan shortly after the war, recommended a long-term study of the survivors to determine any possible medical and biological effects. The proposal to set up an Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC) in conjunction with the Japanese National Institute of Health was approved by Truman in November 1946 and an ABCC office was opened in January 1948 with long-term financial support from the US Atomic Energy Commission. Large programmes of research were initiated into the genetic and somatic effects of radiation, as seen in the survivors of the two explosions, and a new era was opened (Cannan, 1962 re-examined at a central clinic at 9 months of age. Parents were classified in five exposure groups as shown in Table II and compared with regard to age, parity, economic status, consanguinity, prevalence of syphilis, previous induced abortion and degree of cooperation. The programme began in stages from 1948 and was closed in January 1954 because of the rapid reduction in the birth rate, when the only suggestive evidence of variation in the direction expected from genetic theory was the trend in the sex ratio (Neel et al., 1953; Neel and Schull, 1956 (Cogan et al., 1952) and mental retardation in children most proximally exposed in utero (Plummer, 1952) , but the plan for repeated clinical examinations proved to be ill-conceived. By 1954, it was seeking to examine regularly some 5000 people, who had been exposed within 2000 m and had suffered symptoms attributable to irradiation, and a control group of men and women matched for sex and age, who had been exposed beyond 2500 m, and it was foundering in the face of negative findings and declining participation. There was, consequently, thought of closing it down (Beebe, 1979) .
Reaction to the hydrogen bomb test Just then another event occurred that altered the perspective of governments and their scientific advisers throughout the world. In June 1954, a hydrogen bomb was exploded over Eniwetok in the Pacific, which had 1000 times the power of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs, and radioactive fallout al., 1955) . This was immediately accepted and the sample, with some minor modifications (Jablon et al., 1965; Beebe et al., 1971) became the basis for the Life Span Study, which is still continuing and has provided the principal evidence on which our current knowledge of the long-term effects of radiation is based. To it was added a mortality study of 2800 individuals exposed in utero and non-exposed controls (Kato, 1971) and the registration of all cases of cancer, irrespective of the individual's subsequent survival (Beebe and Hamilton, 1975) and research was begun to enable tissue doses to be estimated for each member of the cohort.
In the UK, a smaller study was instigated by the Medical Research Council, with the specific purpose of determining the quantitative relationship between X-ray dose and the incidence of leukaemia (Medical Research Council, 1956 ; Court Brown and Doll, 1957) . Data were obtained for 14 000 patients who had been given radiotherapy for ankylosing spondylitis and 1500 patients treated by other means and this study has also been continued to the present day and expanded to include mortality from all types of cancer and a detailed assessment of the doses received in each major organ (Weiss et al., 1994 Genetic effects That mutations would have been produced in the sperm and ova of the survivors of the explosions was never doubted. The risk was assumed to be proportional to the dose received, when the dose was small enough not to produce infertility, and damage to the world's genetic stock was long thought to be the principal hazard of the fallout from the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. In 1956, however, the British Medical Research Council, in its report on the hazards of nuclear radiation, could base its estimates of the dose required to double the mutation rate in humans only on the assumption that it was similar to that of the animals and plants for which it had reliable information. It concluded that the best estimate of the doubling dose was between 30 and 80 rads (0.3-0.8 Gy). Even the lowest estimate of 3 rads (0.03 Gy) based on the assumption that all mutations were normally caused by natural radiation, was not thought to be contradicted conclusively by what had by then been found in Japan.
More precise determination of the susceptibility of human gonads to irradiation was, however, so important that the ABCC initiated a fresh programme to obtain further data on the trend in the sex ratio at birth with parental dose and to compare the lifespan of children, one of whose parents had been irradiated, with that of suitable controls. The first objective was attained by the end of 1962, by which time the sex was known for over 140 000 children, 74 000 of whom had one or more exposed parents. The regression of the sex ratio on dose was then found to be trivial and in the opposite direction to that postulated (Schull et al., 1966) and no further study of this effect seemed worthwhile.
The tion 1956 . This estimate does not take into account the few observations of reciprocal translocations (which were equal in the two populations) nor the sex ratio results (which were counter to the genetic hypothesis) nor the data on growth and development (which revealed no hint of a radiation effect). If these other indicators could also be taken into account, the estimate of the doubling dose would be increased further.
Paternal radiation and childhood leukaemia The only material challenge to this conclusion came from Gardner et al.
(1990) when they adduced evidence to suggest that paternal irradiation in the course of employment at the nuclear reprocessing plant in Sellafield was responsible for the small cluster of young people with leukaemia that occurred in the village of Seascale, 3 km south of the plant. Seven cases were seen between 1955 and 1983, which was about ten times the number expected. A case-control study of children born and resident in the county found that the risk was concentrated in children whose fathers had received substantial doses of ionising radiation at work before the child's conception (Table IV) . Support for Gardner's idea came from studies in which radiation histories (mostly of medical X-rays) had been given by parents some years after the event dose at levels less than 0.5 Gy. Uncertainty about the biological mechanisms and the absence of appropriate human data limit these findings to the effects of acute doses and prohibit their extrapolation to doses given at low dose rates.
Abortion No other risk of congenital defect has been seen, possibly because any dose large enough to produce such an effect in the first 7 weeks also causes the embryo to be aborted, as about half the embryos that were exposed to 0.5 Gy or more in this period were lost (Committee for the Compilation of Material on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 1981).
Non-specific ageing The third effect, an increased rate of non-specific ageing, was predicted on the basis of animal experiments in which irradiated rodents experienced a shortening of life proportional to dose with a 7% loss per LD50 (National Academy of Sciences, 1956b) . Within weeks, the idea spread round the world that 1 rad led to the loss of expectation of about 10 days' life (4.7% shortening of life per 100 rad, Storer and Sanders, 1958) showed that the mortality of US radiologists was higher than that of non-radiological physicians and higher still than that of US ophthalmologists and ear-nose-throat specialists, both from cancer and from other causes, and they concluded that the results 'warrant the inference that occupational exposure to ionizing radiation on the part of physicians has in the past produced a non-specific life shortening effect'. British radiologists, in contrast, were found to have a lower mortality from causes other than cancer than other doctors and other men in the same socioeconomic class, even if they began practice before 1921 when stringent precautions against exposure began to be taken (Smith and Doll, 1981) . No general life-shortening effect has been observed in the major studies of radiation workers whose doses of radiation have been measured (Cardis et al., 1995) , nor in the Life Span Study at doses less than 2 Gy (Shimizu et al., 1991) . The weight of the evidence, in my opinion, suggests that the idea should be abandoned, unless some new experimental evidence is obtained to revive it.
Risk of cancer
The fourth effect, an increased risk of cancer, came gradually to be accepted as due to one or more somatic mutations, partly as a result of epidemiological observations in the mid 1950s (Court Brown and Doll, 1957; Lewis 1957 ) but even as late as 1960 it continued to be resisted by some distinguished radiobiologists (Brues, 1960) . With acceptance of its mutational origin, the risk of cancer displaced genetic effects as the principal cause of public concern and the dose tolerated for radiation workers and the general public has been progressively reduced. The principal quantitative evidence has come from the Life Span Study, but it has been extended, modified, and checked by the results of :biological experiments and epidemiological studies of patients irradiated for medical reasons, people exposed at work, children exposed to fallout from the testing of nuclear weapons and populations exposed to different amounts of natural radiation by virtue of their place of residence.
Radon in houses For a few risks the Life Span Study is of no help, as it provides no information about the effects of high linear energy transfer radiation or of any radionuclides absorbed internally, the most important of which is the effect of radon in house air. That radon causes a risk of lung cancer roughly proportional to dose and no material risk of any other type of cancer is abundantly clear from 11 major studies of men exposed to radon in mines Darby et al., 1995) . Extrapolation from the experience of miners is, however, fraught with difficulty, for the risk varies not only with total exposure and dose rate but also, in a way specific for lung cancer, with time since exposure occurred and in a complex way with the amount smoked. If this were not enough, there are the additional difficulties of extrapolating from male miners who were exposed in adult life, to members of the general public, who breathe less deeply, breathe air that is less contaminated with dust, were exposed in childhood and include women. Temporary solutions have been proposed by the US National Research Council (1991) and Lubin et al. (1995) and the latter have used them to estimate that the proportions of lung cancer deaths attributed to domestic radon in the US are 10% in men and 12% in women, less in smokers and rising to 28% and 31% respectively in non-smokers. Lubin et al.'s (1995) formulae have not yet been applied in Britain, but the proportions would be likely to be about half those in the US, corresponding to the lower mean concentration of the gas (arithmetic mean 20 Bq m-3 against 49 Bq m-3).
In these circumstances estimates of the effect of radon in houses, which may vary 100-fold, need to be validated by direct observations on people with and without lung cancer, with known smoking habits and measured concentrations of radon in their houses. Such studies, however, also have their difficulties, including the need to measure concentrations in past places of residence, which may have been pulled down or altered, random errors in measurement and differences in behaviour that affect the dose that individuals receive in a given environment. So far seven such studies have been reported, four of which have led to estimates of risk that are not very different from those extrapolated from the experience of miners (Schoenberg et al., 1990; Ruosteenoja, 1991; Pershagen et al., 1992) , while three have not suggested any risk at all (Blot et al., 1990; Alavanja et al., 1994; Letourneau et al., 1994) . Several others are in train and the best estimate of risk should eventually be obtained from the pooled results of the most reliable studies. If then we add on the complexities of the model required to determine the dose received by the cells capable of giving rise to lung (or rather bronchial) cancer, it follows that these epidemiological observations can as yet tell us little or nothing about the quality factor appropriate for alpha radiation. Nor can the much fewer observations of the effect of the intake of radium on the risk of bone sarcoma or of thorium on the risk of liver cancer and leukaemia (National Research Council, 1988) .
Irradiation offetus For another risk the evidence from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors and case-control studies of affected patients is conflicting: namely, the risk of childhood cancer from irradiation in utero. Two children developed cancer under 15 years of age out of 1263 exposed to the bombs prenatally with less than one expected (0.73) and the estimated excess per Gy was 0.5% with 95% confidence limits of -0.2% to 2.4%. Neither child had leukaemia and the upper 95% confidence limit for this disease was 1.1% per Gy (Yoshimoto et al., 1988 (Hewitt et al., 1966; Bithell and Stewart, 1975; Monson and MacMahon, 1984; Mole, 1990) that they cannot easily be dismissed. A causal explanation for the observed relationship is, moreover, supported by the evidence from the Oxford Survey of Childhood Cancers, which shows that the risk increased with the number of films to which the fetus was exposed in the last trimester of intra-uterine life and declined compatibly with the temporal decline in obstetric dose (Bithell, 1989) . On detailed examination the various objections that have been made to a causal explanation seem likely to be invalid (Doll and Wakeford, 1995) and the relatively small excess observed in children exposed prenatally in Hiroshima and Nagasaki is best attributed to an unusual effect of chance. On this basis, the best estimate of the risk of childhood cancer from irradiation in utero is 6% per Gy and of childhood leukaemia 2.5% per Gy (Muirhead et al., 1993) , the last of which is only slightly greater than that from exposure in early childhood (1.8% per Gy). (International Commission on Radiological Protection, 1990) . It is now clear, however, that the analyses that led to these conclusions were too simple.
Physically, it appears from measurements of specific radionuclides in concrete and soil that the neutron doses at distances greater than 1 km from the hypocentre of the explosion over Hiroshima have been underestimated and this may lead to a reduction in dose estimates by 10-20% (Straume et al., 1992; UNSCEAR, 1994 other than leukaemia depends crucially on whether the excess relative risk remains constant throughout life for those exposed in youth, as it has done approximately for those exposed at older ages or whether it falls, as the cancer incidence data suggest (Thompson et al., 1994) . The importance of this is indicated in Table VII , which shows the variation in the estimated lifetime risks of exposure-induced death from cancers other than leukaemia from doses of 0.2 and 1.0 Sv depending on the trend in risk in young people after 1987.
How far there is any variation in the susceptibility of organs is unclear, apart from the greater susceptibility of the marrow to the induction of myeloid and acute lymphatic leukaemia and the reduced (even zero) susceptibility to chronic lymphatic leukaemia. The excess relative risk per Sv and its 90% confidence limits for 18 types of cancer, as observed in the Life Span Study over the period 1958-87, is shown in Figure 2 . Nearly all the confidence limits overlap. The high relative risk of breast cancer is not seen in irradiated cohorts in western countries and may result from the low normal risk of breast cancer in Japan. There appears, however, to be a generally low relative risk for cervix cancer, Hodgkin's disease, and possibly non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.
There is evidence too from several studies to suggest that the temporal distribution of the risk varies by site, the risk of lung cancer, for example, falling 20 years after exposure and the risk of bladder cancer starting late and persisting longer. It may consequently prove necessary to work out dose-response relationships separately for each of the main types of cancer.
The most important consideration may, however, prove to be the variation in risk with the size of the background risk, which may subsume much of the variation with sex. For it is variation with background risk, or lack of it, that determines the possibility of generalising observed risks from one population to another. Hitherto it has been assumed that the excess relative risk will be the same for all populations. The current method may prove to be right for some cancers, but for others it is almost certainly wrong. For lung cancer, for example, the excess relative risk is much greater for females than for males, and this may indicate that the interaction with smoking is nearer additive than multiplicative, as has been found in the studies of men exposed to radon in mines and from in vitro studies of cell transformation (Piao et al., 1990) . If similar variation holds for other types of cancer, it will vitiate the generalisation of site-specific risks.
Important though these qualifications are for estimating the precise effect of a given dose in different situations, none of them will, I think, modify our general conclusions about the nature of the dose-response relationship. Nor, taken all together, should they alter our estimate of the regression of risk on dose by as much as 2-fold in either direction.
Effect of very small doses What then can we conclude about the risks extrapolated down to the low doses of modern radiography and nuclear medicine and the minute doses to which we are continuously exposed from natural sources in the environment and our own bodies? Epidemiology can take us so far, but sooner or later we have to resort to a model for quantification. Given a model, which it has been shown fits human experience at moderate doses, epidemiology can at least check that the risk extrapolated down to very low doses has not been seriously underestimated. A model that results in a linear, or a linear quadratic, relationship with dose without a threshold accords well with the effects observed for doses of 100 mGy and above up to about 4 Gy, when killing effects begin to distort the curve. In my own view, which may not be widely shared, the observations on the irradiated fetus justify extending the model down to about lOmGy, but whether there is such an efficient repair mechanism for damage to DNA or a reaction to stress that greatly reduces the effect of tiny doses is something that observations on humans are unable to decide.
So far as leukaemia is concerned, the evidence of the effect of the accumulation of the tiny doses received in Utah from the testing of nuclear weapons in Nevada (Stevens et al., 1990) and of those received in the Nordic countries from the testing of nuclear weapons worldwide (Darby et al., 1992) shows that the current model does not seriously underestimate the effect and may even be thought to give it some support. And if this is true of leukaemia it is likely also to be true for other cancers caused by irradiation. If then we allow that doses received at very low dose rates have only half the effect that the dose-response relationship at high dose rates would suggest, we can conclude that natural radiation in the UK, other than radon, is responsible for about 1.4% of all fatal cancers and that the effect of medical uses of ionising radiation can be deduced pro rata, depending on the age of the subject and his or her expectation of life.
Conclusion
In this review I have shown that clinical intuition served the early exponents of Rontgen's discovery reasonably well. It enabled them to detect the acute effects quickly, to recognise the potential of X-rays to cause cancer in many tissues and to control exposure so as to avoid aplasia of the marrow. It failed to achieve consensus about the risk of leukaemia and completely failed to recognise that the risk of cancer was proportional to cumulative dose and that doses less than those that caused gross mental retardation could damage the fetal brain. Not surprisingly it failed to develop any sense of the extent of the genetic hazard.
The development of epidemiology since the mid-century has provided quantitative estimates of all these risks with greater precision than is available for most other stochastic effects. There remain some uncertainties, many of which are capable of being cleared up within a few years. Precision in the estimation of very small risks by epidemiological methods is, however, a will-o'-the-wisp. Sooner or later we have to resort to a model for quantification, which observations on humans can help to define. Given a model, investigation of the effect of very small doses can then ensure that the risk extrapolated from higher doses is not substantially underestimated, and this I believe it has already done.
